
In January 1997 CIA defector Edward Lee Howard introduced Robert Eringer, his book editor, to former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. Both were unaware that Eringer was working secretly for FBI counterintelligence.
Eringer rused the Soviet spy lord to believe he would orchestrate publication in the West of his memoirs. Eringer leaned on Kryuchkov in Moscow to answer scores of sensitive questions that would “improve his book”—questions designed by FBI analysts to shed light on a variety of issues.
In addition to answering Eringer’s numerous questions, Kryuchkov wrote 40 pages of material that has never been published--until now--marking the first time a KGB chairman has written for publication in the West. (Kryuchkov died in November 2008 at the age of 83.)
For the whole story, order a copy of Ruse: Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence (Potomac Books Inc, 2008), available at amazon.com.
SPY LORD CHAPTER FOUR: HUMINT
Under my stewardship the First Directorate and the KGB in general engaged in heated arguments, at all levels, on whether or not science and technology methods are more important than human intelligence (HUMINT) i.e. the use of agents.
I have come to believe that HUMINT was and will always be the main bread-and-butter of operational activities. It is through secret agents that the most valuable information is obtained.
The CIA managed to infiltrate a number of Soviet defense institutions and scientific-industrial organizations, and gain access to our most important state secrets, at a cost to us of billions of roubles. Countering these infiltrations was extremely difficult. The starting point was always a signal of some kind—an indication of an information leak. We had to pick up a thread and then unravel a whole ball of yarn.
I was once given the task of visiting a foreign country to meet a particularly valuable recruit. Elaborate security precautions were taken. We met for 26 hours, during which we took brief naps. This agent cooperated with us for ideological reasons, and his knowledge, experience and connections within the country in which he operated were immense. His grasp of the political and economic situation of his country was superb, and his information was crucial to uncovering the identity of an important spy working in our midst.
Agent information is the most sacred of any intelligence service. Nothing is more guarded than the agents themselves. It is, therefore, extremely rare that they are caught in any matter other than betrayal from within one’s own service. Our recent failures in this arena can be explained in no other way.
Soviet intelligence has always worked side-by-side with the services of our close allies. But we never exchanged information on agent networks.
Once, an intelligence chief of a socialist country offered me a list of their agents. I politely refused, explaining to my surprised colleague that I should not know; that if his network was corrupted, I should not be part of the circle requiring investigation.
CHAPTER FIVE: INTER SERVICE RIVALRY
Relations between the First Directorate and the other organs of state security, such as counter-intelligence, were less than ideal. Criticism and rivalry prevailed. The First Directorate was called The White Bone, and thought by other organs to be snobby. This was based on envy: employees of the First Directorate had the opportunity to go abroad, for short or long periods, which inadvertently gave them profitable financial advantages.
I firmly resolved to put an end to such bickering; to create conditions for healthy, friendly relationships between intelligence and counter-intelligence. To this end, I initiated regular meetings between leaders of both groups, and intensified professional contact. We even conducted exchanges of officers.
It did not solve the problem, but relations were improved.



